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Abstract—A rumor spreading in a social network or a disease
propagating in a community can be modeled as an infection
spreading in a network. Finding the infection source is a
challenging problem, which is made more difficult in many
applications where we have access only to a limited set of
observations. We consider the problem of estimating an infection
source for a Susceptible-Infected model, in which not all infected
nodes can be observed. When the network is a tree, we show
that an estimator for the source node associated with the most
likely infection path that yields the limited observations is given
by a Jordan center, i.e., a node with minimum distance to the
set of observed infected nodes. We also propose approximate
source estimators for general networks. Simulation results on
various synthetic networks and real world networks suggest
that our estimators perform better than distance, closeness, and
betweenness centrality based heuristics.
Index Terms—Infection source estimation, social network, SI
model, infection spreading, Jordan center.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks like Facebook and Google+ have
grown immensely in popularity over the last ten years [1]–
[3]. For example, Facebook reports over 690 million daily
active users on average in its most recent quarterly report,
a 27% increase year-over-year [4]. The increase in the size
and complexity of such social networks have also been driven
by increasing use of technologies like smart phones that
facilitate more frequent and faster updates and interactions
between members of the social network [5]. Physical social
networks consisting of communities of individuals have also
grown bigger and more complex due to urbanization and
technological advancements in transportation [6]. As a result,
a piece of information or rumor posted by one individual in
a network can be propagated to a large number of people in
a relatively short time. For example, a false rumor about the
financial performance of a listed company may be spread by
market manipulators to influence the price of the company’s
stock. An essay containing opinions inciting racial or religious
hatred may become widely distributed in an online social
network. In some locales like China [7], publication of such
rumors and opinions are illegal, and law enforcement agencies
need to act to identify the rumor and opinion sources. This may
be difficult if the source is anonymous, and significant time and
effort is expended to trace the IP addresses and identities of
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the individual profiles carrying or linking to the opinion piece.
In another example, it is important to identify the index case
of a disease spreading in a community in order to determine
the epidemiology of the disease.
In this paper, we are interested to estimate the source of a
rumor or disease spreading in a social network. We can think
of both the rumor or disease as an “infection” that is spreading
in the network, and our goal is to find the infection source with
only a limited amount of information. For example, given the
large size of various online social networks like Facebook, it
is impossible for a law enforcement agency to analyze all the
profiles that post a particular rumor or link to it. Monitoring of
network traffic to identify potential terrorist plots can only be
done at select nodes in the network. Similarly, some individu-
als may have immunity to a disease or may be asymptomatic
to it. Finding the infection source is thus a very challenging
problem, and we are often limited to knowing just the topology
of the network, and a subset of nodes that are infected.
However, because of its importance in various applications
as described above, the infection source estimation problem
has continued to attract considerable interest from the research
community over the last two years. In the following, we give a
brief overview of works related to infection source estimation.
A. Related Works
Motivated by applications related to marketing, significant
existing works related to infection spreading in a social
network have focused on the identification of influential nodes
in the network. Each node in a network has a probability of
influencing or “infecting” its neighbors. Suppose a company
wants to promote a new product by initially targeting a few
influential nodes in a social network, and hopes these nodes
can subsequently influence a large number of nodes in the
same network to adopt the new product. The references [8]–
[14] consider the problem of identifying a subset of nodes
to maximize the total expected influence of the subset, where
the expectation is taken over all possible realizations of the
infection process. In this paper, we consider a related but
different problem. Our aim is to identify a node most likely
to be the infection source, given a particular realization of
the infection process. One of the first works to address the
infection source estimation problem is [15], which considers
a Susceptible-Infected (SI) model, in which there is a single
infection source, and susceptible nodes are those with at least
one infected neighbor, while infected nodes do not recover.
Subsequently, [16] studies the multiple sources estimation
problem under a SI model; [17] studies the single source
2estimation problem under a SI model with additional a priori
knowledge of the set of suspect nodes; [18] considers the
single source estimation problem for the Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model, where an infected node may recover
but can never be infected again; and [19] investigates the
single source estimation problem for the Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible (SIS) model, where a recovered node is susceptible
to be infected again.
All the infection source estimation works listed above
assume complete observations of the set of infected nodes,
which may not be feasible in a lot of practical scenarios. For
example, an user of Google+ may post a rumor on her profile,
and choose to make her post public, which can be seen by
any Google+ user, or to restrict access of her post to only a
select group of friends. The Google+ user who restricts access
to her posting will appear to be uninfected to an observer not
amongst the select group of friends. The observer will thus
only be able to observe a limited subset of all the infected
nodes in the network.
The reference [20] considers the source estimation problem
when only a fraction of infected nodes can be observed.
However, [20] assumes that for each of these observed nodes,
we know the infection time of that node, and from which
neighboring node the infection comes from. In an online social
network, the posting time of a rumor gives us information
about the infection time, but it is often difficult to determine
which neighbor the rumor is obtained from, unless the user
explicitly references the person she obtained the rumor from.
In a physical social network scenario like a disease spreading,
the infection times are often not available or inaccurate due to
varying degrees of immunity amongst the populace. Therefore,
in this paper, we do not make either of the assumptions
used by [20] so that our proposed methods can be used
in more general applications that have limited information.
Incorporating knowledge of infection times into our estimation
methods may however improve the estimation accuracy for
specific applications like online social networks, and is part
of our future research work.
We remark that in practice, the probability of exactly
detecting the source node can be less than 0.5, depending on
the underlying network topology [15]. For example, suppose
that all infected nodes can be observed, and the underlying
network is a complete graph. Then, any reasonable source
estimator should choose any of the infected nodes with equal
probability. Therefore, from a practitioner’s point of view, esti-
mating the source node is important only because it allows the
practitioner to narrow down the set of potential source nodes
to those within a few hops of the estimator. Identifying the
correct source in practice requires further domain knowledge
and forensic information, a process that can be very time
consuming if performed on the full set of infected nodes.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we study the infection source estimation
problem for a SI model with limited observations of the set
of infected nodes. Our main contributions are the following.
(i) For tree networks, we derive an estimator for the source
node associated with the most likely infection path that
yields the observed subset of infected nodes. We propose
an algorithm with time complexity O(n) to find the
proposed estimator, where n is the number of nodes in
the subtree spanning the set of observed infected nodes.
(ii) For general networks, we propose an approximate es-
timator for the source node associated with the most
likely infection path. We then convert the problem into
a Mixed Integer Quadratically Constrained Quadratic
Program (MIQCQP), which can be solved using standard
optimization toolboxes. However, since the MIQCQP has
high complexity, we also propose a heuristic algorithm
with time complexity O(n3) to find the proposed esti-
mator, where n is the size of the network.
(iii) We verify the performance of our estimators on vari-
ous synthetic tree networks, small-world networks, the
western states power grid network of the United States,
and part of the Facebook network. In our simulation
results, our estimator performs better than the distance,
closeness, and betweenness centrality based estimators.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model, assumptions and problem
formulation. In Section III, we derive a source estimator for
tree networks and present an efficient algorithm to find the
proposed estimator. In Section IV, we derive an approximate
source estimator for general networks and suggest two ways
to find our proposed estimator. We present simulation results
in Section V to verify the effectiveness of the proposed
estimators. Finally we conclude and summarize in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first describe our system model and
assumptions, and then we provide a problem formulation for
finding the infection source based on the most likely infection
path. We also summarize various notations and definitions that
we use throughout this paper at the end of this section.
A. Infection Spreading Model
We model a social network using an undirected graph
G = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices or nodes that
represent the individuals in the network, and E is the set
of edges representing relationships between the individuals.
Whether an edge exists between two nodes is determined
by the application that we are interested in. For example, in
identifying a rumor source for an online social network like
Facebook or Google+, an edge exists between two individuals
if they are friends who can see each other’s postings on the
network. In determining the index case of a disease spreading
in a community, we can create a social network modeling
the connections between individuals in the community, where
an edge exists between individuals if they are likely to have
physical or close proximity contact with each other (e.g.,
family members living together or colleagues working in the
same office). Two nodes are said to be neighbors if there is an
edge between them. In this paper, we assume that there is an
“infection” started by a single node in the graph G, and that
spreads to neighboring nodes. The term “infection” refers to a
property possessed by a node, and can mean different things
3under different contexts. In identifying a rumor source for an
online social network, if a node posts the same rumor on its
online account, it is considered to be infected. In an actual
disease spreading in a community, once a person displays the
disease symptoms or has been diagnosed with the disease, he
is considered to be infected. We are interested to estimate the
source of this infection, given observations of a limited number
of nodes in the network.
Models to describe spreading of viral epidemics in human
populations have been widely studied in [21]–[23], and these
have been adapted to model information diffusion in online
social networks [24]–[28]. The SI model arises as a natural
way to model the spreading process of viral epidemics [29]–
[31] and information diffusion [28]. In the SI model, the
nodes have three possible states: infected (i), susceptible (s)
and non-susceptible (n). Infected nodes are those nodes that
possess the infection, and will remain infected throughout.
Susceptible nodes are uninfected nodes, but which have at
least one infected neighbor. Lastly, non-susceptible nodes are
uninfected nodes that do not have any infected neighbors.
In this paper, we adopt a discrete time SI model to describe
the infection spreading in G. This is an appropriate model for
online postings on social networks as most postings are usually
not removed, i.e., an infected node stays infected [25], as well
as for modeling opinion dynamics in a social network [28],
and some disease spreadings [29], [30]. We note that this by
no means models all typical infection spreading processes of
interest. Various other researchers, including ourselves, have
considered more complex models like continuous time SI
models [15]–[17], SIR models [18], and SIS models [19],
but with the assumption that all infected nodes are known.
These models are out of the scope of our current paper. We
note however that the optimal estimator under our decision
framework is the same as that for the more complex models in
[18], [19], leading to the interesting and somewhat surprising
result that our proposed estimator is in some sense universal
(cf. Section III-B).
In our SI model, time is divided into discrete slots, and the
state of a node u in time slot t is denoted by a random variable
X(u, t). At time t = 0, we assume that there is only one
infected node v∗ ∈ V , which we call the infection source. We
assume that the infection process is a discrete time Markov
process with probability measure P, and we assume that a
susceptible node becomes infected with probability p at the
beginning of the next time slot, where p ∈ (0, 1). We assume
that every susceptible node becomes infected independently
of each other, while non-susceptible nodes remain uninfected
with probability one.
We assume that not all infected nodes exhibit their infected
state to an observer. The Google+ example described in
Section I-A is one example. Similarly, individuals who are
carriers of a disease may appear to be asymptomatic. An
infected node that exhibits its infected status is said to be
explicit, and we let X(u, t) = e when u becomes infected.
We let X(u, t) = i if u is infected but is non-explicit. A
node that is observed to be uninfected can then either be
actually uninfected or non-explicit. We call these nodes non-
observable.
s
i
e
1− p
p(1− qu)
pqu 1
1
Fig. 1. Transition probability of a susceptible node u.
We let qu be the probability that the node u is explicit, and
assume that nodes are explicit or not independently of each
other. If qu = 1 for all nodes u ∈ V , our model reduces
essentially to that in [15], [16], whereas if qu is close to zero
for all nodes u ∈ V , the problem becomes intractable as most
nodes appear to be uninfected, making the performance of
any estimator of the source node poor in practice. Intuitively,
if qu ≥ p for all nodes u, then with high probability, we will
be able to observe enough number of infected nodes in order
to estimate the infection source with reasonably good accuracy
relative to that for the SI model where all infected nodes are
explicit. However, we only require a weaker assumption in this
paper. Throughout this paper, we assume that for all u ∈ V ,
we have
max
(
0, 2−
1
p
)
≤ qu ≤ 1. (1)
(Note that 2 − 1/p < p.) In the case where p > 1/2, our
assumption requires that qu is sufficiently large for every node
u. This is because given a sufficiently long amount of time,
a large number of nodes will become infected, and if most
of these nodes are non-explicit, then it becomes very difficult
to find a good estimator for the source. On the other hand, if
p ≤ 1/2, our assumption is trivial and holds automatically. In
this case, we note that our model allows us to set qu = 0 or
1 for each node u, where those nodes with qu = 1 are the
ones we actively monitor for the infection. This is similar to
[20], except that we do not make the additional assumptions
that we know the time an explicit node gets infected, and the
neighbor it gets the infection from. The transition probability
of a susceptible node is summarized in Fig. 1.
Finally, consider the extreme case where the source node
has only one neighbor. In this case, the infection can spread
in only one direction and any centrality based estimator is
expected to perform badly. To avoid this kind of boundary
effect, we assume that every node has degree at least two.
B. Most Likely Infection Path and Source Estimator
Let Xt = {X(u, τ) : u ∈ V, 1 ≤ τ ≤ t} be the collection
of the states of all nodes in V from time 1 to t. We say that
a realization Xt = {X(u, τ) : u ∈ V, 1 ≤ τ ≤ t} of Xt is
an infection path. At some elapsed time t since the start of
the infection spreading, we observe the set of explicit nodes,
which is denoted as Ve, and assumed to be non-empty. We say
that an infection path Xt is consistent with Ve if for all u ∈ Ve,
we have X(u, t) = e, and no other nodes in V is explicit in
Xt. We do not assume that we know the elapsed time t. Let Xv
and Tv be the set of all possible consistent infection paths and
4feasible elapsed times respectively, assuming that the infection
starts at v and results in Ve.
We want to design a source estimator based on Ve and
knowledge of the graph G, so as to optimize a statistical crite-
rion. A common approach is to find the maximum likelihood
(ML) estimators that maximize the conditional probability of
observing the explicit set Ve, given by
(vˆML, tˆML) ∈ argmax
v∈V
t∈Tv
∑
Xt∈Xv
P(Xt = Xt | v∗ = v).
It has been shown that finding the ML estimator for a general
graph when all nodes are explicit is a #P-complete problem
[15]. Therefore, finding the ML estimator based on Ve is even
more challenging, because unlike the case where all nodes are
explicit, we only observe a subset of the infected nodes, which
may not contain the infection source. We therefore adopt a
different statistical criterion, first proposed by [18] to estimate
the infection source in a SIR model, and also used by [19] in
a SIS model. We seek to find the estimator given by
vˆ ∈ argmax
v∈V
max
t∈Tv
Xt∈Xv
P(Xt = Xt | v∗ = v), (2)
which is the source node associated with a most likely infection
path out of all possible infection paths that are consistent with
Ve. See Fig. 2 for an example of most likely infection path.
Note that there may be many possible most likely infection
paths, and our aim is to find the source node of any one of
them.
In Section III, we first find a characterization for a most
likely infection path when the underlying graph G is a
tree, and then derive a source estimator based on that. For
general networks G, finding a most likely infection path is
difficult. Therefore, in Section IV, we propose approximate
estimators to identify the source. Extensive simulation results
are provided in Section V to verify the performance of our
proposed estimators.
C. Some Notations and Definitions
In this subsection, we list some notations and definitions
that we use throughout this paper. See Fig. 2 for examples of
some of these notations and definitions.
1) For any set A, we let |A| be the number of elements in A.
For a graph H , we let |H | denote the number of nodes in
H . Furthermore, for a node u, we use u ∈ H to mean that
u is a node in the vertex set of H .
2) Suppose that G is a tree, and v is the root. We assign
directions to each edge of G so that all edges point towards
v. For any u ∈ V , let pa(u) be the parent node of node u
(i.e., the node with an incoming edge from u), and ch(u)
be the set of child nodes of u in G (i.e., the set of nodes
with outgoing edges to u).
3) For any tree H and any node u in H , let Ni(u;H) be the
set of nodes i hops away from u in H .
4) For any tree H and a pair of nodes u and v in H , let
Tu(v;H) be the subtree of H rooted at node u with the
first link in the path from u to v in H removed.
Tv3(v1;G) Tv4(v1;G)
Ve = {v2, v3} G
v1
v2 v3 v4
v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10
Fig. 2. An example network G, where shaded nodes are the explicit nodes.
Assume that p = 1/2 and qu = 1/2, ∀u ∈ V . If the elapsed time
t is 1, only v1 can be the source, and the most likely infection path is
X1({v1, v2, v3, v4}, 1) = {i, e, e, s}. The conditional probability of X1
is (1 − qv1)(pqv2)(pqv3 )(1 − p) = (1/2)6 . If t = 2, the possible source
nodes are v1, v2, v3 and v4. The probability of the most likely infection
path for each of these nodes are (1/2)9 , (1/2)10 , (1/2)10 and (1/2)11 ,
respectively. It can be shown that if t > 2, the infection path probabilities
become smaller. Therefore, we see that the most likely elapsed time is t = 1,
the most likely infection path is X1, and v1 is our estimated source.
Taking v1 as the root, we have pa(v2) = v1, and ch(v2) = {v5, v6}. Since
v7 and v8 are one hop away from v3, we have N1(v3;Tv3 (v1;G)) = 2.
The largest distance between v1 and any explicit node is 1, so d¯(v1, Ve) = 1.
We also have Tv4(v1;G) as an example of a non-observable subtree since
all nodes in this subtree do not belong to Ve.
5) Given any pair of nodes v, u ∈ V , let d(v, u) denote the
length of the shortest path between v and u, which is also
called the distance between v and u. Given any set A ⊂ V ,
denote the largest distance between v and any node u ∈ A
to be
d¯(v,A) = max
u∈A
d(v, u).
We call the largest distance between v and any explicit node
d¯(v, Ve) the infection range of v. The node with minimum
infection range is called a Jordan center of Ve [32].
6) Suppose that v is the infection source. For any node u, we
say that Tu(v;G) is a non-observable subtree if
Tu(v;G)
⋂
Ve = ∅.
7) For any infection path Xt, any subset J ⊂ V , and any
0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ t, let Xt(J, [i, j]) be the states of nodes in J
during time slots i to j in the infection path Xt. To avoid
cluttered expressions, we abuse notations and let
P
(
X
t(J, [i, j]) = Xt(J, [i, j]) |
X
t(J, [i′, j′]) = Xt(J, [i′, j′]), v∗ = v
)
= Pv
(
Xt(J, [i, j]) | Xt(J, [i′, j′])
)
. (3)
When we want to remind the reader of the state of a node u
at specific times in the conditional probability Pv(X(u, i) |
X(u, i′)), we use the notation Pv(X(u, i) = a | X(u, i′) =
b), where a, b ∈ {i, s,n, e} are the states of u at times i
and i′ respectively.
8) For any v ∈ V and any feasible elapsed time t ∈ Tv,
we say that an infection path Xt is most likely for
(v, t) if Xt ∈ argmaxX˜t∈Xv Pv(X˜
t). We say that an
infection path Xt is most likely for v if (Xt, t) ∈
argmaxt′∈Tv,X˜t′∈Xv Pv(X˜
t′). Finally, an infection path
5Xt is called a most likely infection path if there ex-
ists some v ∈ V and t ∈ Tv such that Pv(Xt) =
maxu∈V,t′∈Tu,X˜t′∈Xu Pu(X˜
t′).
III. SOURCE ESTIMATION FOR TREES
In this section, we consider the case where the underlying
network G is a tree. We first derive some properties of a most
likely infection path, and then show that the source estimator
associated with the most likely infection path that we have
characterized is given by the Jordan center of Ve.
A. A Most Likely Infection Path
In this subsection, we show that although we have assumed
that G is an infinite tree, we can restrict our search for a
most likely infection path for v to the subgraph of G with
nodes within the infection range d¯(v, Ve) of v. In the following
lemma, we first show that for any source node v ∈ V , a most
likely infection path for v with a finite number of infected
nodes can be found. It’s proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Suppose that G is a tree. Then, for any node v ∈ V ,
and feasible elapsed time t ∈ Tv, there exists a most likely
infection path Xt for (v, t) such that for any u ∈ V with
non-observable Tu(v;G), we have X(u, τ) 6= i for all τ ≤ t.
The following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix B,
shows that given the elapsed time t, a most likely infection
path for a node v is given by a path whose nodes “resist” the
infection, and each node becomes infected only at the latest
possible time.
Lemma 2. Suppose that G is a tree, and the infection source
is v ∈ V . Let H be the minimum connected subgraph of G
that spans Ve and v. Suppose that the elapsed time is t ∈ Tv.
Then, for any u ∈ H\{v}, the first infection time tu for u in
any infection path is bounded by
d(v, u) ≤ tu ≤ t− d¯(u, Tu(v;H)). (4)
Furthermore, there exists a most likely infection path Xt for
(v, t) such that the first infection time for u ∈ H\{v} is given
by
tu = t− d¯(u, Tu(v;H)). (5)
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 characterize a most likely infection
path consistent with Ve, with the property that a minimum
number of nodes are infected, and each infected node becomes
infected at the latest possible time. We call this the latest
infection path.
Definition 1. Suppose that G is a tree. For any v ∈ V , and
any feasible elapsed time t ∈ Tv , the latest infection path
Xt for (v, t) is the infection path that satisfies the following
properties:
(i) Let H be the minimum connected subtree of G that spans
Ve∪{v}. Then, Xt(u, τ) ∈ {s,n} for all u /∈ H and for
all τ ≤ t.
(ii) For each u ∈ H\{v}, the first infection time of u is
tu = t− d¯(u, Tu(v;H)).
The following proposition then follows from Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2.
Proposition 1. Suppose that G is a tree. Then for any v ∈ V ,
and any feasible elapsed time t ∈ Tv , the latest infection path
for (v, t) is a most likely infection path for (v, t).
We now show that a most likely infection path for any v ∈ V
is the latest infection path for (v, t), where t is chosen to be
as small as possible.
Proposition 2. Suppose that G is a tree. For any v ∈ V , we
have the following.
(a) The set of all feasible elapsed times is Tv = [d¯(v, Ve),∞).
(b) For the sequence of latest infection paths {Xt}t∈Tv , we
have Pv(Xt) is monotonically decreasing in t ∈ Tv.
(c) The most likely elapsed time is given by d¯(v, Ve), and a
most likely infection path for v is the latest infection path
for (v, d¯(v, Ve)).
Proof: Claim (a) follows because the infection can prop-
agate at most one hop further from the source node v in one
time slot, therefore if t < d¯(v, Ve), the infection can not reach
the explicit nodes d¯(v, Ve) hops away from v.
Next, we show claim (b). Fix a t ∈ Tv and consider the
latest infection paths Xt and Xt+1. Let H be the minimum
connected subtree of G that spans Ve and v. Suppose that
H 6= {v}, then from Definition 1, we have Xt+1(V, [2, t +
1]) = Xt(V, [1, t]) and Xt+1(w, 1) = s for all w ∈ N1(v;H),
yielding
Pv(X
t+1)
Pv(Xt)
≤
∏
w∈N1(v;H)
Pv(X
t+1(w, 1) = s | Xt+1(w, 0) = s)
=(1− p)|N1(v;H)| < 1,
where the last inequality follows because H 6= {v} and
|N1(v;H)| > 1. On the other hand if H = {v}, the infection
does not spread from v in both latest paths Xt and Xt+1, and
we have
Pv(X
t+1)
Pv(Xt)
= (1− p)|N1(v;G)| < 1,
since all neighbors of v remain susceptible throughout the
elapsed time, and we have assumed that the degree of v is
at least two. This proves claim (b). Claim (c) now follows
from claim (a) and claim (b), and the proof of the lemma is
complete.
B. Source Associated with a Most Likely Infection Path
In this subsection, we derive the source estimator associated
with a most likely infection path. We first show that we can
find an infection path for a node with a smaller infection
range that is more likely than any most likely infection path of
another node with a larger infection range. This in turn implies
that the source estimator we are looking for is the Jordan center
of Ve. We start with two lemmas that show the relationship
between the latest infection paths of two neighboring nodes.
Lemma 3. Suppose that G is a tree, and let H be the minimum
connected subtree of G spanning Ve. Suppose that u and v
6are neighboring nodes in H with d¯(v, Ve) < d¯(u, Ve). Then,
we have
(i) l ∈ Tv(u;H), for all l ∈ argmaxx∈Ve d(u, x); and
(ii) d¯(v, Ve) = d¯(u, Ve) − 1, and there exists l ∈ Tv(u;H)
such that d(v, l) = d¯(v, Ve).
Proof: To prove (i), we note that if l /∈ Tv(u;H), we have
d¯(v, Ve) ≥ d(v, l) = d(u, l)+1 = d¯(u, Ve)+1, a contradiction.
Therefore, (i) holds. Then for l such that d(u, l) = d¯(u, Ve),
we have d¯(v, Ve) ≥ d(v, l) = d(u, l)− 1 = d¯(u, Ve)− 1 since
l ∈ Tv(u;H). This implies (ii), and the lemma is proved.
Lemma 4. Suppose that G is a tree, and let H be the minimum
connected subtree of G spanning Ve. Then, for any pair of
neighboring nodes u and v in H with dv = d¯(v, Ve) < du =
d¯(u, Ve), we have
Pv(X
dv) > Pu(X
du),
where Xdv and Xdu are the latest infection paths for (v, dv)
and (u, du) respectively.
Proof: To prove the lemma, it suffices to construct an
infection path X˜dv with source node v, and show that it
has higher conditional probability than Xdu . Let tv be the
first infection time of node v in the infection path Xdu . We
first show that tv = 1. Since u is the infection source, the
infection can propagate at most du − tv hops away from
node v within the subtree Tv(u;H). From Lemma 3(ii), if
tv > 1, we have dv = du − 1 > du − tv, a contradiction.
Therefore, we must have tv = 1 in the infection path Xdu .
Let X˜dv(Tv(u;H), [1, dv]) = Xdu(Tv(u;H), [2, du]), and we
have
Pu(X
du(Tv(u;H), [1, du]))
Pv(X˜dv(Tv(u;H), [1, dv]))
= p, (6)
where the equality holds because the probability that v is
explicit or not appears in both the numerator and denominator.
Consider any node w ∈ N1(u, Tu(v;H)). Since d(v, w) =
2, it takes at least two time slots for an infection starting at
v to reach w. Moreover, since du = dv + 1, by Lemma 2
and Lemma 3(i), the first infection time of w in the path Xdu
is at least 3. Therefore, we can set X˜dv(Tu(v;H), [1, dv]) =
Xdu(Tu(v;H), [2, du]), and we obtain
Pu(X
du(Tu(v;H), [1, du]))
Pv(X˜dv(Tu(v;H), [1, dv]))
=
1
p
(1 − p)2|N1(u,Tu(v;H))|
<
1
p
, (7)
where the inequality follows by the assumption that every node
has degree at least two. Multiplying (6) by (7), we obtain
Pu(X
du(H, [1, du]))
Pv(X˜dv(H, [1, dv]))
< p ·
1
p
= 1. (8)
Finally, we consider the nodes in G\H . Let Tz(v;G) be any
non-observable subtree such that z ∈ G\H has a neighboring
node w ∈ H . By Lemma 1, z remains uninfected in Xdu .
Let z stay uninfected in X˜dv as well. Let the node w first
become infected at time tw(u) in Xdu and at time tw(v)
in X˜dv . Then, z stays uninfected in Xdu and X˜dv with
probabilities (1−p)du−tw(u) and (1−p)dv−tw(v), respectively.
Since dv = du − 1 and tw(v) ≥ tw(u) − 1, we have
du − tw(u) ≥ dv − tw(v), and Pu(Xdu(G\H, [1, du])) ≤
Pv(X˜
dv(G\H, [1, dv])). Combining this with (8), we conclude
that Pu(Xdu) < Pv(X˜dv), and the proof is complete.
We are finally ready to show that the Jordan centers of Ve
are the source estimators in (2).
Theorem 1. Suppose that G is a tree, then the source
estimator in (2) associated with the most likely infection path
is a Jordan center of Ve, given by
sˆ ∈ argmin
v∈V
d¯(v, Ve). (9)
Proof: It can be shown that if G is a tree, then there are
at most two Jordan centers for Ve, and if there are indeed two
Jordan infection centers, they are neighboring nodes [18]. If
there are two neighboring Jordan centers, we can treat them as
a single virtual node, therefore without loss of generality, we
assume that there is only one Jordan center sˆ. Let H be the
minimum connected subtree of G spanning Ve. Then sˆ ∈ H .
Consider any path (sˆ, v1, v2, · · · , vm) in H , where m ≥ 1.
We show that
d¯(sˆ, Ve) < d¯(v1, Ve) < . . . < d¯(vm, Ve). (10)
The first inequality in (10) holds by assumption. We now show
that the rest of the inequalities in (10) also hold. Choose a
l ∈ Ve such that d(sˆ, l) = d¯(sˆ, Ve). If l /∈ Tv1(sˆ;H), we
have d¯(vi, Ve) = d(sˆ, l) + i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, so (10) holds.
Suppose now that l ∈ Tv1(sˆ;H). Note that the set A =
Ve\Tv1(sˆ;H) is non-empty, otherwise d¯(v1, Ve) < d¯(sˆ, Ve)
and sˆ cannot be a Jordan center. Consider a node l′ such that
l′ = argmaxv∈A d(sˆ, v). If d(sˆ, l′) ≤ d(sˆ, l)− 2, we have
d¯(v1, Ve) = max (d(v1, l
′), d(v1, l))
= max (d(sˆ, l′) + 1, d(sˆ, l)− 1)
= d(sˆ, l)− 1,
and the infection range of v1 is less than that of sˆ, a con-
tradiction. Therefore, we have d(sˆ, l′) ≥ d(sˆ, l)− 1. Suppose
that d¯(vi+1, Ve) ≤ d¯(vi, Ve) for some i ∈ [1,m − 1]. Let l˜
be a node such that d(vi, l˜) = d¯(vi, Ve). Then, we must have
l˜ ∈ Tvi+1(vi;H), otherwise we have a contradiction. We then
have
d¯(vi+1, Ve) ≥ d(vi+1, l
′)
= d(sˆ, l′) + i+ 1
≥ i+ d(sˆ, l)
≥ 2i+ d(vi, l˜)
> d(vi, l˜),
a contradiction. Therefore (10) holds. By repeatedly applying
Lemma 4, Proposition 1 and Proposition 2(c), we have that
any most likely infection path for sˆ has higher probability
than that for vm, and the theorem is proved.
We observe that our source estimator is the same as that for
the SIR infection process [18] and the SIS infection process
[19]. This is somewhat surprising as the spreading models
are significantly different from each other. (Note also that our
7proofs differ significantly from that in [18].) This indicates
that the statistical criterion in (2) is robust to the underlying
infection model, and the Jordan center is a universal source
estimator.
C. Finding a Jordan Center
A centralized linear time complexity algorithm has been
proposed in [33] to find the Jordan center in a tree. It first
computes the diameter of the tree and then returns a midpoint
of any longest path in the tree as the Jordan center. In this
subsection, we present a message passing algorithm, somewhat
similar to that of [33] in the quantities being computed at each
node, but which can be implemented in a distributed fashion.
Our algorithm also has linear time complexity.
Let H be the minimum connected subtree of G spanning
Ve. We assume that |H | > 2 since otherwise finding the
Jordan center is trivial. Our proposed Jordan Center Estimation
(JCE) algorithm is formally presented in Algorithm 1. The
main idea behind the algorithm is that for |H | > 2, a Jordan
center v must satisfy the following necessary and sufficient
conditions: (i) it has degree at least 2 in H , and (ii) if
M = {ρu : u ∈ N1(v;H), ρu is a path with the maximum
length among all paths with first edge being (v, u)}, then the
difference in lengths of the longest and second longest paths in
M is at most 1. This can be shown using the same arguments
as that in the proof of Theorem 1.
JCE first randomly chooses a non-leaf node r ∈ H as
the root node. It then performs an Upward Message-passing
procedure, starting from the leaf nodes up to the root r, where
the message passed from a node v to its parent node pa(v)
consists of its own identity and the length of the longest path
in Tv(r;H).
This upward message-passing procedure terminates when
the root receives all messages from its child nodes. The details
of the upward message-passing procedure are shown in lines
4 to 13 in Algorithm 1. Since each node only passes one
message to its parent, the overall complexity of the upward
message-passing procedure is O(|H |).
In the Downward Message-passing procedure, the root
node r first identifies the two paths in M with the longest
lengths ℓ1(r) and ℓ2(r). If ℓ1(v) − ℓ2(v) ≤ 1, JCE returns
r as the Jordan center. Otherwise, it computes a message
gr(r
(1)) = ℓ2(r) + 1 and sends to r(1), the child node with
the longest path in the Upward Message-passing procedure.
The same process is repeated until a leaf node is reached.
The details are presented in lines 14 to 24 in Algorithm 1.
The complexity of the downward message-passing process
is bounded by the diameter of H . As a result, the overall
complexity of JCE is O(|H |).
IV. SOURCE ESTIMATION FOR GENERAL NETWORKS
In this section, we derive an approximate source estimator
for the case where the underlying network G is a general
network. We also suggest heuristic algorithms to find our
proposed source estimator.
Suppose that the neighbor from which a susceptible node
obtains its infection is randomly chosen from one of its
Algorithm 1 Jordan Center Estimation (JCE) Algorithm
1: Input: H is the minimum connected subtree of G span-
ning Ve, with |H | > 2.
2: Output: sˆ, the Jordan center for Ve.
3: Initialization: randomly select a non-leaf node r ∈ H as
the root node
4: Upward Message-passing:
5: for each v ∈ H do
6: if v is a leaf then
7: fv(pa(v)) = 1
8: else
9: Store v(1) = argmaxu∈ch(v) fu(v), ℓ1(v) =
fv(1)(v), and ℓ2(v) = maxu∈C fu(v), where C =
ch(v)\{v(1)}, with ℓ2(v) = 0 if C = ∅. Ties are
broken randomly.
10: fv(pa(v)) = ℓ1(v) + 1
11: end if
12: Pass fv(pa(v)) and its identity to pa(v)
13: end for
14: Downward Message-passing:
15: for each v ∈ H starting from root r do
16: if v is not the root r then
17: ℓ2(v) = max(ℓ2(v), gpa(v)(v))
18: end if
19: if ℓ1(v)− ℓ2(v) ≤ 1 then
20: sˆ = v
21: else
22: Pass gv(v(1)) = ℓ2(v) + 1 to v(1)
23: end if
24: end for
25: return sˆ
infected neighbors. Then, the path traced out by an infection
spreading in G is a tree. For any infection path Xt, let T (Xt)
be the subtree of G traced out by Xt. Any tree Tv with root
v, for which there exists an infection path consistent with Ve
is said to be an infection tree consistent with Ve. Let Tv be
the set of infection trees consistent with Ve, and have source
node v. Then, we have
max
v∈V
max
t∈Tv
Xt∈Xv
Pv(X
t) = max
v∈V
max
T∈Tv
max
t∈Tv
Xt:T (Xt)=T
Pv(X
t), (11)
which implies that to find a source node associated with the
most likely infection path in (2), we first find the most likely
infection tree consistent with Ve, and then find a most likely
infection path that traces out this infection tree using the results
in Section III-B. However, finding the set of infection trees
consistent with Ve is difficult. We derive a simple property
that Tv must satisfy for each v, suggest an approximation for
it, and provide two heuristic methods to find the approximate
most likely infection tree.
Lemma 5. Suppose that G is a general network, and v ∈ V
is the infection source. Then, there is no loss in optimality
in (11) if we restrict Tv to be the set of all infection trees
consistent with Ve that have all non-source leaf nodes in Ve.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemma 1 because any
8non-observable leaf node is the root of a non-observable
subtree.
From Lemma 5 and the fact that the source estimator for a
tree is given by a Jordan center, we construct a subgraph Hv
of G for each v ∈ V , by first finding a shortest path tree from
v to each node in Ve, and then adding all edges in G incident
to the nodes of the shortest path tree. We approximate Tv by
the set of spanning trees of Hv , denoted as Tˆv, and adopt the
approximate source estimator given by
s˜ = max
v∈V
max
T∈Tˆv
max
t∈Tv
Xt:T (Xt)=T
Pv(X
t). (12)
We now turn to finding the most likely infection tree in the
set Tˆv . We start with a characterization of its probability in
the following result. For any source node v, and any infection
tree T ∈ Tˆv , let DT (u) = d¯(u, Tu(v;T )) be the height of the
subtree of T rooted at u.
Lemma 6. Suppose that G is a general network, and v ∈ V
is the infection source. Then, for any infection tree T with root
v and consistent with Ve, we have
max
t∈Tv
Xt:T (Xt)=T
Pv(X
t)
= p|T |−1(1− p)
∑
u∈T\{v}(DT (pa(u))−DT (u))−|T |+1
·
∏
u∈Ve
qu
∏
u∈T\Ve
(1− qu). (13)
Proof: Every non-source node u ∈ T \{v} gets infected
during the infection spreading process, and this occurs with
probability p|T |−1. From Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, in a
most likely infection path for v, the first infection time for
any node u ∈ T is t˜u = d−DT (u), where d = d¯(v, Ve). The
parent node pa(u) gets infected at time t˜pa(u) = d−Dpa(u),
therefore there are t˜u− t˜pa(u)− 1 = DT (pa(u))−DT (u)− 1
time slots in which that u remains susceptible, and this occurs
with probability (1−p)DT (pa(u))−DT (u)−1. Taking the product
over all non-source nodes in Tv , we obtain the lemma.
From Lemma 6, we see that our proposed estimator in (12)
can be found by finding the node v that maximizes
|T ∗v | log p+ (F
∗
v − |T
∗
v |) log(1− p) +
∑
u∈T∗
v
\Ve
log(1 − qu),
where
F ∗v = min
T∈Tˆv
∑
u∈T\{v}
(DT (pa(u))−DT (u)) , (14)
and T ∗v is the minimizer in the right hand side of (14).
In the following, we propose two heuristic methods to find
T ∗v and F ∗v for any v ∈ V . Although we have assumed that
G is infinite in Section II to simplify our theoretical analysis,
in practice, we have access to only a finite graph G. We then
iterate either of our proposed methods over all nodes in G.
A. MIQCQP
For any v ∈ V , let Hv be the subgraph of G used in
defining Tˆv (cf. discussion preceding (12)). By expanding the
telescoping sum in (14), it can be shown that the objective
function in (14) is equivalent to the objective function of the
following MIQCQP,
min
∑
i,j∈Hv
EijDi −
∑
i∈Hv\{v}
Di (15)
subject to
∑
j∈Hv
Eji =
{
0, if i = v
1, if i 6= v
(16)
∑
i,j∈Hv
Eij = |Hv| − 1 (17)
Eij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j ∈ Hv (18)
Di ≥ (Dj + 1)Eij , ∀i ∈ Hv, ∀j ∈ N1(i;Hv)
(19)
Di ≤
∑
j∈N1(i;Hv)
(Dj + 1)Eij , ∀i ∈ Hv (20)
where Eij = 1 if and only if the edge (i, j) is chosen as part
of T ∗v , and Di is a variable corresponding to DT∗v (i).
The above MIQCQP does not find the exact optimal T ∗v
in (14) because of several approximations that we have made.
The constraints (16)-(18) restrict the feasible solution space to
the spanning trees of Hv . However, it is not possible represent
the quantities DT (u) in (14) exactly as quadratic constraints.
We use the quadratic constraints (19)-(20) as approximations.
The constraint (19) derives from the fact that for all nodes i
in a tree T spanning Hv, we have DT (i) ≥ DT (j) + 1 for
all j that are child nodes of i in T . In addition, for a non-
source node i that has only one child node j, the value Di
is canceled out in (15). In order to improve the convergence
speed, we introduce the quadratic constraint (20) as an upper
bound for Di.
The MIQCQP in (15) can be solved using the OPTI Tool-
box [34], which utilizes Solving Constraint Integer Programs
(SCIP) [35] as the solvers. However, these solvers have high
complexity, and are not suitable for large networks. Therefore,
we propose an alternative, low-complexity heuristic algorithm
in the following and compare their performances in Section
V.
B. Reverse Greedy
It can be shown that
F ∗v = min
T∈Tv
∑
u∈T
(DegT (u)− 2)DT (u) + 2DT (v), (21)
where DegT (u) is the number of neighboring nodes of u in
T . We see from (21) that to obtain the minimizer, the degree
of u should be chosen to be small if DT (u) is large. Based on
this intuition, we propose a heuristic algorithm in Algorithm
2, which we call the Reverse Greedy (RG) algorithm. The
algorithm attempts to adjust the infection tree found so that
those nodes close to the source node has lower degrees, while
those further away have correspondingly higher degrees.
Given a node v ∈ V , RG first constructs a shortest path
tree T rooted at v and spanning Hv using a breadth first
search algorithm [36], incurring a time complexity of O(|Hv |).
Starting with a leaf node x that is furthest away from v, RG
adjusts the tree T by choosing a neighboring node y of x with
9the largest d(v, y) value (with ties broken by another criterion
given in lines 6 to 17 in Algorithm 2), and attaching x to
y. This procedure is repeated up the tree T until the node
v is reached. At each node x, the number of neighbors is
O(|Hv|) and lines 19 to 28 has a time complexity of O(|Hv|).
Therefore, the complexity of RG is O(|Hv |2). Since we need
to iterate over all nodes in order to find the source estimator,
the overall complexity is O(|V |3).
Algorithm 2 Reverse Greedy (RG) Algorithm
1: Inputs: v ∈ V , and Hv (cf. discussion preceding (12))
2: Outputs: F ∗v in (21) and its minimizer T ∗v .
3: Construct a shortest path tree T rooted at v and that spans
Hv using breadth first search [36]. Compute DT (u) and
UT (u) = d(v, u) for all u ∈ T .
4: for d = DT (v) DownTo 1 do
5: for each node x ∈ {u : UT (u) = d}, in order of
increasing DT (x) do
6: Set Y = ∅
7: for each neighboring node y of x in Hv do
8: if UT (y) ≤ DT (v)−DT (x) − 1 then
9: Add y into set Y
10: if y is the parent of x in T then
11: Set D′T (y) to be d¯(y, Ty(v;T )\Tx(v;T ))
12: else
13: Set D′T (y) = DT (y)
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: Choose y ∈ Y with the largest UT (y), with ties
broken by choosing the y with the largest D′T (y).
18: Modify T by removing the edge between x and its
parent and connecting x to y.
19: Set ∆x = UT (y) + 1− UT (x)
20: if ∆x 6= 0 then
21: Set UT (z) = UT (z) + ∆x, ∀z ∈ Tx(v;T )
22: end if
23: Set ∆T (y) = max(DT (y), DT (x) + 1)−DT (y)
24: while ∆y 6= 0 do
25: Set DT (y) = DT (y) + ∆y
26: Set ∆y = max(DT (pa(y)), DT (y) + 1) −
DT (pa(y))
27: Set y = pa(y)
28: end while
29: end for
30: end for
31: return T ∗v = T and F ∗v computed using (21).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results using both
synthetic and real world networks to evaluate the performance
of the proposed estimators. We use the following three com-
mon centrality measures as benchmarks to compare with our
estimators.
(i) The distance centrality of v ∈ G is defined as
CD(v) =
∑
i∈Ve
d(v, i),
and the node with minimum distance centrality is called
the distance center (DC). It is shown in [15] that the DC
is the ML estimator for regular trees under a SI model
where all nodes are explicit.
(ii) The closeness centrality of v ∈ G is defined as
CC(v) =
∑
i∈Ve,i6=v
1
d(v, i)
,
and the node with maximum closeness centrality is called
the closeness center (CC).
(iii) The betweenness centrality of v ∈ G is defined as
CB(v) =
∑
i,j∈Ve,i6=j 6=v
σij(v)
σij
,
where σij is the number of shortest paths between node
i and node j, and σij(v) is the number of those shortest
paths that contain v. We call the node with maximum
closeness centrality the betweenness center (BC).
A. Tree Networks
We evaluate the performance of the JCE algorithm on three
kinds of synthetic tree networks: regular tree networks where
the node degree is randomly chosen from [3, 6], and two
types of random trees, denoted as random-1 and random-2,
where the degree of every node is randomly chosen from
[3, 6] and {3, 6} respectively. Note that random-1 trees are less
“regular” than regular trees, and random-2 trees are even less
“regular”. For each kind of synthetic tree network, we perform
1000 simulation runs. In each simulation run, we randomly
generate a tree, and choose a node to be the infection source.
Then we simulate the infection using a SI model, where p is
chosen uniformly from (0, 1) and qv is chosen uniformly from
[max(0, 2−1/p), 1] for each node v. The spreading terminates
when the number of infected nodes is greater than 200. We
then run JCE on the explicit nodes to estimate the infection
source and compare the result with the benchmarks.
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Fig. 3. Average error distances for different tree networks. The average
diameters of the regular, random-1, and random-2 trees are 14, 13 and 13
hops, respectively.
The error distance is the number of hops between the
estimated and the actual infection source, and is shown in
Fig. 3. We see that as the underlying network becomes less
“regular”, the error distances of all benchmarks increase, while
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Fig. 4. Average error distances for different general networks in the first
comparison. The average diameters of the power grid network, small-world
network, and Facebook network are 46, 20, and 18 hops, respectively.
that of JCE remains relatively stable. In practice, the structures
of the underlying tree networks are usually far from regular.
B. General Networks
We evaluate the performance of the MIQCQP and RG
algorithms on three kinds of general networks: synthetic small-
world networks [37], the western states power grid network
of the United States [37] and a small part of the Facebook
network with 4039 nodes [38].
Since the MIQCQP approach has very high complexity with
an average running time about 2000 times that of RG, we
restrict the number of infected nodes to be 50 in the first com-
parison. In each simulation run, the infection probability p is
chosen uniformly from (0, 1) and qv is chosen uniformly from
[max(0, 2− 1/p), 1] for each node v. Fig. 4 shows that both
MIQCQP and RG have smaller average error distances than
all benchmarks, with RG only slightly worse than MIQCQP.
Therefore, in the rest of the simulations, we will only compare
RG with the benchmarks.
In the next comparison, we consider infection sizes of more
than 200 nodes. In each simulation run, we randomly choose
a fraction of the infection nodes to be explicit. We call this
fraction the explicit ratio. We perform simulations with the
explicit ratio ranging from 10% to 100%. Fig. 5 shows the
average error distances of RG and all benchmarks for different
explicit ratios on all three kinds of general networks. We see
that RG has smaller average error distances in almost all cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have derived infection source estimators for a SI model
when not all infected nodes can be observed. When the
network is a tree, we showed that the estimator is a Jordan
center. We proposed an efficient algorithm with complexity
O(n) to find the estimator, where n is the size of the network.
In the case of general networks, we proposed approximate
source estimators based on a MIQCQP formulation, which
has high complexity, and a heuristic algorithm with complexity
O(n3). Simulations suggest that our proposed algorithms have
better performance than distance, closeness, and betweenness
centrality based methods, with the estimated source on average
within a few hops of the actual infection source. In this
work, we have assumed that we have access only to very
limited information. An interesting future direction includes
incorporating information like infection times into the source
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(b) Small-world network.
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(c) Facebook network.
Fig. 5. Average error distances for different explicit ratios in different general
networks. The average diameters of the power grid network, small-world
network, and Facebook network are 46, 20, and 18 hops, respectively.
estimator. It is also of interest to investigate source estimation
methods for richer models like SIS models when there are
only limited observations.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The proof proceeds by mathematical induction on the
elapsed time t.
Basis step: Suppose that t = 1, and consider any non-
observable subtree Tu(v;G). Suppose that d(v, u) > 1. Since
the infection can spread at most one hop away from v in
each time slot, the node u must remain uninfected up to time
t = 1 and the claim holds trivially. We now consider only the
neighbors of v. Let u be a neighbor of v that is the root of
a non-observable subtree, and suppose that every most likely
infection path X˜1 for (v, t) has X˜(u, 1) = i. Choose one such
most likely infection path X˜1, and let X1 be another infection
path with the same states as X˜1, except that X(u, 1) = s.
Then, we have
Pv(X
1)
Pv(X˜1)
=
1− p
p(1− qu)
≥ 1,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption (1). This
is a contradiction, and therefore the claim holds if t = 1.
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Inductive step: Suppose that the claim holds for all elapsed
times t ≤ n. Let t = n+ 1, and consider any non-observable
subtree Tu(v;G) and a most likely infection path X˜t for (v, t)
with X˜(u, t) = i.
If d(v, u) > 1, let t˜ denote the first infection time of
the parent node r = pa(u) in X˜t, where t˜ ≥ 1. Since
the infection process follows a SI model, we can treat r as
the infection source of Tr(v;G), and the remaining elapsed
time of the infection process is t′ = t − t˜ ≤ n. From the
induction hypothesis, we can construct a most likely infection
path Xt′(Tr(v;G), [1, t′]) such that u remains uninfected up
to time t. The new infection path constructed from Xt by
setting X˜t(Tr(v;G), [t˜ + 1, t]) = Xt
′
(Tr(v;G), [1, t
′]) then
has probability at least that of X˜t, thus proving our claim.
Now suppose that d(v, u) = 1 and the first infection time
of node u in the path X˜t is tu ∈ [1, t]. The previous argument
shows that it is possible to choose X˜t so that w remains
uninfected up to time t for all w ∈ Tu(v;G)\{u} since
d(v, w) > 1. We now suppose X˜t is chosen as such. Let
Xt be an infection path that is the same as the most likely
infection path X˜t but with Xt(u, τ) = s for all τ ≤ t. Then,
we have
Pv(X
t) = a
t∏
τ=1
Pv(X
t(u, τ) = s | Xt(u, τ − 1) = s)
= a(1− p)t, (22)
where a = Pv(Xt(V \Tu(v;G), [1, t])). Similarly, we have
Pv(X˜
t) =a
tu−1∏
τ=1
(
Pv(X˜
t(u, τ) = s | X˜t(u, τ − 1) = s)
· Pv(X˜
t(u, τ) = i | X˜t(u, τ − 1) = s)
)
·
∏
w∈ch(u)
t∏
τ=tu+1
Pv(X˜
t(w, τ) = s | X˜t(w, τ − 1) = s)
=a(1− p)tu−1p(1− qu)(1 − p)
(t−tu)|ch(u)|
≤a(1− p)t−1p(1− qu), (23)
where the last inequality follows because we have assumed
that |ch(u)| ≥ 1. Comparing (22) and (23), and using (1), we
obtain Pv(Xt) ≥ Pv(X˜t), which implies that Xt is also a
most likely infection path. Repeating the same argument for
all non-observable subtrees with roots that are neighbors of v,
we obtain the claim, and the lemma is proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Firstly, it is easy to see that every node in H is infected
since otherwise, the infection can not reach the leaf nodes of
H , some of which belong to the set Ve. The lower bound in
(4) follows because the infection can spread at most one hop
away from v in each time slot, and the earliest time for u to
be infected is d(v, u). After node u gets infected at time tu,
the infection can spread at most t − tu hops away from u.
Consider a node ul such that d(u, ul) = d¯(u, Tu(v;H)). By
definition, ul ∈ Ve. In order for the infection to reach node
ul, we require t− tu ≥ d(u, ul), and (4) is shown.
Next, we show (5) using mathematical induction on
d¯(v, Ve). Note that we do not need to consider the case where
d¯(v, Ve) = 0, i.e., no non-source nodes exist in H .
Basis step: Suppose that d¯(v, Ve) = 1. Then we have
d(v, u) = 1 for every non-source node u in H . We want to
show that there exists a most likely infection path so that the
first infection time for u is tu = t. If t = 1, we have tu = 1
because both the lower and upper bounds in (4) are equal to
1. We now suppose that t > 1, and we have tu ∈ [1, t] by (4).
Let X˜t denote a most likely infection path with tu = i, where
1 ≤ i ≤ t−1. We construct another infection path Xt from X˜t
so that Xt(V \{u}, [1, t]) = X˜t(V \{u}, [1, t]) and node u be-
comes infected only at time t. Let a = Pv(Xt(V \{u}, [1, t])).
We then have
Pv(X
t) = aPv(X
t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
= (1 − p)t−1pqu. (24)
The same derivation as in (23), except that here X˜t(u, t) is
explicit instead of non-observable, gives
Pv(X˜
t) =a(1− p)i−1pqu(1− p)
(t−i)|ch(u)|
≤a(1− p)t−1pqu, (25)
where we use the assumption that |ch(u)| ≥ 1 in the last
inequality. By comparing (24) and (25), we obtain Pv(Xt) ≥
Pv(X˜
t), and by repeating the same argument for all neighbors
of v in Ve, we obtain the claim for the basis step.
Inductive step: We assume that (5) holds when d¯(v, Ve) ≤ n.
Fix any u ∈ ch(v) and let m = d¯(u, Tu(v;H)). Treat node u
as the infection source of the subtree Tu(v;H), then by the
induction hypothesis, we obtain a most likely infection path
X˜t with (5) holding for any node w ∈ Tu(v;H)\{u} since
m ≤ d¯(v, Ve)− 1 = n.
For any node w ∈ N1(u;Tu(v;H)), we have the first
infection time of w is t − (m − 1) (note that Tu(v;H) is
not a non-observable subtree), which implies that tu ≤ t−m.
We want to show that tˆu = t − m. Suppose that we have
tu = i, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ t −m − 1 in X˜t. Then, using the
same arguments as in the basis step, we can construct another
infection path with probability at least that of X˜t but with
tu = t−m. This implies our claim, and the lemma is proved.
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